Whole brain emulation ( WBE ), mind uploading or brain upload (sometimes called ” mind copying ” or ” mind transfer “) is the hypothetical process of scanning mental state (Including long-term memory and “self”) of a Particular brain substrate and copying it to a computer. The computer could then run a simulation model of the brain’s information processing, such that it responds in essentially the same way to the original brain (ie, indistinguishable from the brain for all purposes) and experiences having a conscious mind .   
Mind uploading can be accomplished by two methods: Copy-and-Transfer or gradual replacement of neurons. In the case of the former method, it is believed that the subject will be brought to life by scanning and mapping the features of a biological brain, and then by copying, transferring, and storing that information into a computer system or another computational device. The simulated mind could be a virtual reality or simulated world , supported by an anatomical 3D body simulation model. Alternatively, the simulated mind resides in a computer Could That Is inside (or connected to) has (not Necessarily humanoid ) robot Gold biological body in real life. 
Among some futurists and within the transhumanist movement, mind uploading is treated as an important proposed life extension technology. Some believe mind uploading is the best option for preserving the identity of the species, as opposed to cryonics . Another aim of mind uploading is to provide a permanent backup to our “mind-file”, and a means for functional copies of human minds to survive global disaster or interstellar space travels. Whole brain emulation is Discussed By Some futurists have a “logical endpoint”  of the topical computational neuroscience and Neuroinformatics fields, both, about brain simulationfor medical research purposes. It is discussed in artificial intelligence research publications as an approach to strong AI . Computer-based intelligence such as an upload could think much faster than a biological human even if it were no more intelligent. A large-scale society of uploads might, according to futurists, give rise to a singularity , meaning a sudden time constant decrease in the exponential development of technology.  Mind uploading is a central conceptual feature of numerous science fiction novels and films .
Substantial mainstream research in related areas is being conducted in animal brain mapping and simulation, development of faster super computers , virtual reality , brain-computer interfaces , connectomics and information extraction from dynamically functioning brains.  According to supporters, many of the tools and ideas need to be made already available under active development; However, they will admit that others are, as yet, very speculative, but still in the realm of engineering possibility. Neuroscientist Randal Koene has formed a nonprofit organization called Carbon Copies to promote mind uploading research.
Neuroscientists have stated that important functions performed by the mind, such as learning, memory, and consciousness, are due to merely physical and electrochemical processes in the brain. For example, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi wrote in IEEE Spectrum :
“Consciousness is part of the natural world, it depends, we believe, only on mathematics and logic and on the imperfectly known laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, it does not arise from some magical or otherworldly quality.” 
The concept of mind uploading is based on this mechanistic view of the mind, and denies the vitalist view of human life and consciousness. [ quote needed ]
Eminent computer scientists and neuroscientists Predicted That-have specially programmed computers will be able of thought and Even Attain Consciousness, Including Koch and Tononi, Douglas Hofstadter ,  Jeff Hawkins ,  Marvin Minsky ,  Randal A. Koene,  and Rodolfo Llinas . 
Such an artificial intelligence can provide a computational substrate necessary for uploading.
However, even though it is a generalizable, it is conceptually distinct from general forms of information that is derived from a specific source of information. are possible but would compromise or eliminate the life-extension feature generally associated with uploading). The information would become a form of artificial intelligence, sometimes called an infomorph or “noömorph” . [ quote needed ]
Many theorists have presented models of the brain and have established a range of estimates of the amount of computing power needed for partial and complete simulations.  [ citation needed ] Using these models, Moore’s law continues. 
Theoretical benefits and applications
“Immortality” or backup
In theory, the information and processes of the body can be disassociated from the biological body, they are no longer tied to the individual limits and lifespan of the body. In addition, information within a brain or other information (including digital storage or another brain), thereby – of a purely mechanical perspective – reducing or eliminating “mortality risk” of such information. This general proposal was discussed in 1971 by George M. Martin biogerontologist of the University of Washington . 
An “uploaded astronaut” would be the application of mind uploading to human spaceflight . This would eliminate the dangers caused by a zero gravity environment, the vacuum of space and cosmic radiation to the human bodyand would allow smaller spacecraft, like the proposed StarChip .  
Relevant technologies and techniques
The focus of mind uploading, in the case of copy-and-transfer, is on data acquisition, rather than data maintenance of the brain. A set of information (LCOL) can be used in the attempt to characterize the mental contents of a brain.  The LCOL approach can take advantage of self-reports, life-logs and video recordings that can be analyzed by artificial intelligence. A bottom-up approach may focus on the specific resolution and morphology of neurons, the spike times of neurons, the times at which neurons produce action potential responses.
Advocates of mind uploading point to Moore’s law to support the notion that the necessary computing power is expected to become available within a few decades. However, the actual computational requirements for running a human resource are very difficult to quantify, potentially rendering such an argument specious.
Regardless of the techniques used to capture or recreate the function of a human mind, the processing demands are likely to be immense, due to the large number of neurons in the human brain along with the considerable complexity of each neuron.
In 2004, Henry Markram , lead researcher of the ” Blue Brain Project “, stated that “it is not [their] goal to build an intelligent neural network”, based solely on the computational demands such a project would have. 
It would be very difficult, in the brain, every molecule is a powerful computer and we would need to simulate the structure and function of trillions upon trillions of molecules and how they interact. You would be much better off than ever before. 
Five years later, after successful simulation of a rat, the scientist was much more bold and optimistic. In 2009, when he was director of the Blue Brain Project, he asked that
A detailed, functional artificial human brain can be built within the next 10 years 
Required computational capacity strongly depends on the level of simulation model scale: 
|$ 1 million super computer
(Earliest year of making)
|Analog network population model||10 15||10 2||2008|
|Spiking neural network||10 18||10 4||2019|
|Electrophysiology||10 22||10 4||2033|
|metabolome||10 25||10 6||2044|
|States of protein complex||10 27||10 8||2052|
|Distribution of complexes||10 30||10 9||2063|
|Stochastic behavior of single molecules||10 43||10 14||2111|
Simulation model scale
Since the function of the human mind , and how it can arise from the working of the brain neural network , are poorly understood issues, mind uploading links to the idea of neural network emulation . Rather than HAVING to Understand the high-level psychological processes and wide-scale structures of the brain, and model em using classical artificial intelligence methods and cognitive psychology models, the low-level structure of the Underlying neural network is captured, mapped and emulated with a computer system. In computer science terminology, [ dubious – discuss ] rather than analyzing and reverse engineeringThe behavior of the algorithms and data structures that resides in the brain, a blueprint of its source code. The human mind and the personal identity then, theoretically, is generated by the neural network in an identical fashion to be generated by the biological neural network.
The molecule-scale simulation of the brain is not expected to be required, provided that the functioning of the neurons is not affected by quantum mechanical processes. The neural network emulation approach only requires that the functioning and interaction of neurons and synapses be understood. It is expected Sufficient That It is with a black-box signal processing model of how the neurons sponds to nerve impulses ( electrical as well as chemical synaptic transmission ).
A sufficiently complex and accurate model of the neurons is required. A traditional artificial neural network model, for example multi-layer perceptron network model, is not considered as sufficient. A dynamic spiking neural network model is required, which reflects that the neuron fires only when a membrane potential reaches a certain level. It is possible that the model must include delays, non-linear functions and differential equations describing the relationship between electrophysical parameters, such as electrical currents, voltages, ion channel states, and neuromodulators .
Since learning and long-term memory are believed to be successful through synaptic plasticization or synaptic adaptation, the model should include this mechanism. The response of sensory receptors to different stimuli must also be modelled.
Furthermore, the model may have to include metabolism , ie how neurons are affected by hormones and other chemical substances that can cross the blood-brain barrier. It is considered likely that the model should include neuromodulators , neurotransmitters and ion channels . It is considered unlikely that the simulation model has to include protein interaction , which would make it computationally complex. 
A digital computer simulation model of an analog system such as the brain is an approximation that introduces random quantization errors and distortion . HOWEVER, the biological neurons aussi Suffer from randomness and limited precision, for example due to background noise . The errors of the discrete model can be made smaller than the randomness of the choice of non-linearities. The computational power and computer memory must be large enough, preferably in real time .
Scanning and mapping scale of an individual
When modeling and simulating the brain of a specific individual, a brain map or connectivity database showing the connections between the neurons must be extracted from an anatomical model of the brain. For whole brain simulation, this network map shoulds show the connectivity of the whole nervous system , Including the spinal cord , sensory receptors , and muscle cells. Destructive scanning of a small sample of tissue is possible as of 2010. 
HOWEVER, if short-term memory and working memory include prolonged or repeated firing of neurons, as well as intra-neural dynamic processes, the electrical and chemical signal state of the synapses and neurons May be hard to extract. The recorded mind can then be perceived as a memory loss of the events and mental processes immediately before the time of brain scanning. 
A full brain map has been estimated to occupy less than 2 x 10 16 bytes (20,000 TB) and would store the neurons, the synapse type and synapse “weight” for each of the brains’ 10 15synapses.  [ not in citation Given ] HOWEVER, the biological Complexities of true brain function (eg the epigenetic states of neurons, protein components with multiple functional states, etc.) May Preclude an accurate prediction of the volume of binary data required to faithfully represent a functioning human mind.
A possible method for mind uploading is serial sectioning, in which the brain tissue and perhaps other parts of the nervous system are frozen and then scanned and analyzed layer by layer, which for frozen samples at nano-scale requires a cryo- ultramicrotome , thus capturing the structure of the neurons and their interconnections.  The exposed surface of frozen tissue would be scanned and recorded, and then the surface layer of tissue removed. While this would be a very slow and labor-intensive process, the research is currently underway to automate the collection and microscopy of serial sections.  The scans would then be analyzed, and a model of the neural net recreated in the system that the mind was being uploaded into.
There are uncertainties with this approach using current microscopy techniques. If it is possible to replicate neuron function from its visible structure alone, then the resolution afforded by a scanning electron microscope would suffice for such a technique.  However, it is not enough for neuronal functions and functions of neuronal functions (particularly at synapses , but also at other places on the neuron’s cell membrane ). It may be possible to extend the techniques of serial sectioning and to capture the internal molecular makeup of neurons, through the use of sophisticated immunohistochemistrystaining methods that could then be read via confocal laser scanning microscopy . However, as the physiological genesis of ‘mind’ is not currently known, this method may not be able to access all of the necessary biochemical information to recreate a human brain with sufficient fidelity.
Brain simulation It may also be possible to create functional 3D maps of the brain activity, using advanced neuroimaging technology, such as functional MRI (fMRI), magnetoencephalography(MEG, for mapping of electrical currents), or combinations of multiple methods, to build a three-dimensional model of the brain using non-invasive and non-destructive methods. Today, fMRI is often combined with MEG for cognitive tasks, as the methods complement each other. Even though current imaging technology lacks the spatial resolution needed to gather the information needed for such a scan, important recent and future developments are predicted to be used for both spatial and temporal resolutions of existing technologies. 
There is ongoing work in the field of brain simulation, including partial and whole simulations of some animals. For example, the C. elegans roundworm, Drosophila fruit fly, and mouse have all been simulated to various degrees. [ quote needed ]
The Blue Brain Project by the Brain and Mind Institute of the Federal Polytechnic School of Lausanne , Switzerland is an attempt to create a synthetic brain by reverse-engineering mammalian brain circuitry.
The problem of immortality
Though, in theory [ further Top explanation needed ] , an uploaded, or copied release of an individual’s brain Would Have la même memory and personality, the use of this process for eternal life (see Immortality ) is in theory possible for the mere reason That One would not be prolonging one’s life, but simply creating another with the same experience. The creator, original gold would be no difference, and would still die of natural cause. In fact, the idea of mind uploading is likeable to cloning, and in the same way a clone, the “copied” mind would not be the same as the origin, just a copy. [ quote needed ]
Underlying the concept of “mind uploading” (more Accurately “mind Transferring”) is the broad philosophy That consciousness lies dans le brain’s information processing and is in gasoline year emergent feature That Arises from broad neural network high-level patterns of organization, and That the same patterns of organization can be realized in other processing devices. Mind uploading also on the idea that the human mind (the “self” and the long-term memory), just like non-human minds, is represented by the current neural network paths and the weights of the brain synapses rather than by a dualisticand mystic soul and spirit. The mind or “soul” can be defined as the information state of the brain, and is immaterial only in the same sense of the information content of a computer software currently residing in the work-space memory of the computer. Data specifying the information state of the neural network can be captured and copied by a “computer file” from the brain and re-implemented into a different physical form.  This is not to say that they are richly adapted to their substrates. An analogy to the idea of mind uploading is to copy the temporary information state (the variable values) of a computer program from the computer memory to another computer and continues its execution. The other computer Perhaps May-have different purpose hardware architecture emulates the hardware of the computer first.
These issues have a long history. In 1775 Thomas Reid wrote: 
I would be glad to know … whether my brain has lost its original structure, and that it is so intelligent that I would be so intelligent; or, if, two or three such beings should be formed out of my brain; they are going to be me, and they are one and the same intelligent being.
A considerable portion of transhumanists and singularitarians place their hope in the belief that they may become immortal, by creating one or many non-biological functional copies of their brains, thus leaving their “biological shell”. However, the philosopher and transhumanist Susan Schneider claims that at best, uploading would create a copy of the original person’s mind.  Susan Schneideragrees that consciousness has a computational basis, but it does not mean we can upload and survive. According to her views, “uploading” would probably result in the death of the original person’s brain, while only outside observers can maintain the illusion of the original person still being alive. For it is implausible to think that one’s consciousness would leave one’s brain and travel to a remote location; ordinary physical objects do not behave this way. Ordinary objects (rocks, tables, etc.) are not the same here, and somewhere else. At best, a copy of the original mind is created. Others have argued against such conclusions. For example, Buddhist transhumanist James Hughes HAS pointed out That this consideration only goes so far: if one Believes the self is an illusion, worries about survival arent Reasons to Avoid uploading,  and Keith Wiley has presented an argument où all resulting and In the case of an original claim, the subject of the claim is identical in the claim to the original identity, such that the survival of the self is determined retroactively from a strictly subjective position.  
Another potential consequence of mind uploading is that the decision to “upload” may then create a mindless symbol manipulator instead of a conscious mind (see philosophical zombie ).   Are we to assume that they are aware of the fact that they are highly indicative of consciousness? Are we to assume that it is conscious?  Could not be sustained? The mystery of consciousness precises a definitive answer to this question. Numerous scientists, including Kurzweil, strongly believing that it is distinctly conscious (with 100% confidence), is fundamentally unknowable, since consciousness is inherently subjective (see solipsism ). Regardless, some scientists strongly believe in the consequences of computational processes which are substrate-neutral. On the contrary, the results of quantum computation depend on the substrate (see quantum mind ).   
In light of uncertainty on whether to view uploads as conscious, Sandberg proposed a cautious approach: 
Principle of assuming the most (PAM): Assume that any system could have the same mental system.
It is argued that if a copy of one’s mind did exist, it would be impossible to recognize one’s own mind.  The argument for this stance is the following: For a computational mind to recognize an emulation of itself, it must be capable of deciding whether two Turing machines (namely, itself and the proposed emulation) are functionally equivalent. This task is uncomputable due to the uncertainty of equivalence , thus it can not exist in a computational procedure in the mind that is capable of recognizing an emulation of itself.
Ethical and legal implications
The Process of Developing emulation technology raises ethical issues related to animal welfare and artificial consciousness .  The neuroscience required to develop brain emulation would require animal experimentation, first on invertebrates and then on small mammals before moving on to humans. Sometimes the animals would need to be euthanized in order to extract, slice, and scan their brains, but sometimes behavioral and in vivo measures would be required, which might cause pain to living animals. 
In addition, the resulting animal emulsions themselves  Bancroft argues for the plausibility of consciousness in brain simulations on the basis of the ” fading qualia ” thought experiment of David Chalmers . He then concludes: 
If, as I argue above, a detailed computational simulation of the brain is possible operationally equivalent to an organic brain, it follows that we must consider extending protections against suffering to simulations.
It might help reduce emulation suffering to develop virtual equivalents of anaesthesia, and more. However, some experiments may require a fully functioning animal suffering and emulation. Animals could also be affected by their injuries and suffering.  Issues also arise with regard to the moral status of partial brain emulations, which is more important than other neuromorphic emulations. 
Brain emulations could be broken down by computer viruses or malware, without needing to destroy the underlying hardware. This may make murder easier than for physical humans. The attacker might take the power of computing for its own use. 
Many questions arise regarding the legal personhood of emulations.  Would they be given the rights of biological humans? If a person makes an emulated copy of himself and then dies, does the emulation inherit his property and official positions? Could the emulation ask to “pull the plug” when its biological version was terminally ill or in a coma? Would it help to treat emulations as teenagers for a few years so that the biological creator would maintain temporary control? Would the criminal penalties receive the death penalty, or would they be forced to change data as a form of “rehabilitation”? Could an upload have marriage and child care? 
If simulated minds would have come true and if they have been assigned rights of their own, it can be difficult to ensure the protection of “digital human rights”. For example, social science researchers might be exposed to simulated minds, or even isolated societies of simulated minds, to controlled experiments in which many copies of the same minds are exposed (serially or simultaneously) to different test conditions. [ quote needed ]
Political and economic implications
Emulations Could create a number of terms That might Increase Risk of War, Including inequality, exchange of power dynamics, is feasible technological arms race to build emulations first, first-strike advantages , strong loyalty and willingness to “die” Among emulations, and triggers for racist, xenophobic, and religious prejudice.  If emulations run much faster than humans, there might not be enough time for human leaders to make wise decisions or negotiate. It is possible that humans would react violently against growing power of emulations, especially if they depress human rights. Or perhaps emulations would not be the same, and even more likely defensive measures might be interpreted as offense . 
Emulation timelines and AI risk
There are few feasible technologies that humans have refrained from developing. The neuroscience and computer-hardware technologies that can make their brain emulation possible are widely desired for other reasons, and logically their development will continue into the future. Assuming that emulation technology will arrive, a question becomes whether we should accelerate or slow its advance. 
Arguments for speeding up brain-emulation research:
- If neuroscience is the bottleneck on brain emulation rather than computing power, it may be more erratic and unpredictable based on new scientific discoveries happen.    Limited computing power would mean the first emulations would run more easily, and it would be more time for technology to transition through society. 
- Improvements in manufacturing, 3D printing, and nanotechnology may accelerate hardware production,  which could increase the “computing overhang”  from excess hardware relative to neuroscience.
- If one AI-development group had a lead in emulation technology, it would have more time to win an arms race to build the first superhuman AI. Because it would be easier, it would have more freedom to consider AI risks.  
Arguments for slowing down brain-emulation research:
- Brain-inspired algorithms, such as neural networks, reinforcement learning, and hierarchical perception. This could accelerate risks from uncontrolled AI .  Participants at a 2011 AI workshop estimated an 85% probability that neuromorphic AI would arrive before brain emulation. This was based on the idea that brain emulation would require understanding some brain components, and it would be easier to tinker with these ideas than to reconstruct the entire brain. By a very narrow margin, the participants on balance would be expected to increase the risk of an AI risk. 
- Waiting might give society more time to think about the consequences of brain emulation and development institutions to improve cooperation.  
Emulation research would also accelerate neuroscience as a whole, which might accelerate medical advances, cognitive enhancement, lie detectors, and capability for psychological manipulation . 
Emulations might be easier to control than de novo AI because
- We understand better human abilities, behavioral tendencies, and vulnerabilities.  
- Emulations could more easily inherit human motivations. 
- Emulations are harder to manipulate than de novo AI, because brains are messy and complicated; this could reduce risks of their rapid takeoff.   Also, emulations may be more material than AI, which would also slow the speed of a transition.  Unlike AI, an emulation would not be able to rapidly expand beyond the size of a human brain.  Emulations running at digital speeds would have less differential intelligence vis-à-vis AI and so might more easily control AI. 
As counterpoint to these considerations, Bostrom notes some downsides:
- Even if we better understand human behavior, the evolution of emulation behavior under self-improvement may be much less predictable than the evolution of safe de novo AI under self-improvement. 
- Emulations can not be inherited by all motivations. Perhaps they would inherit our dark motivations or would be abnormally in the unfamiliar environment of cyberspace. 
- Even if there is a slow takeoff towards emulations, there would still be a second transition to de novo AI later on. Two intelligence explosions may mean more total risk. 
Ray Kurzweil , director of engineering at Google , claims to know and anticipate that they will be able to “upload” their entire brains to computers and become “digitally immortal” by 2045. Kurzweil made this claim for many years, eg during his speech 2013 at the Global Futures 2045 International Congress in New York, which claims to subscribe to a similar set of beliefs.    Mind uploading is also advocated by a number of researchers in neuroscience and artificial intelligence , such as Marvin Minsky [ citation needed ]while he was still alive. In 1993, Joe Strout created a small web site called the Mind Uploading Home Page, and began advocating the idea of cryonicscircles and elsewhere on the net. This site has not been actively updated in recent years, but it has spawned other sites including MindUploading.org, run by Randal A. Koene , who also moderates a mailing list on the topic. These advocates see mind uploading a medical procedure which could eventually save countless lives.
Many transhumanists look forward to the development and deployment of mind uploading technology, with transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom predicting that it will become possible within the next century. 
Michio Kaku , in collaboration with Science , hosted a documentary, Sci Fi Science: Physics of the Impossible , based on his book Physics of the Impossible . Oven episode, titled “How to Teleport”, mentions that mind uploading viasuch techniques as quantum entanglement and whole brain emulation using an advanced MRI machine can enable people to be transported to vast distances at near light-speed.
The book Beyond Humanity: CyberEvolution and Future Minds by Gregory S. Paul and Earl D. Cox, is about the eventual (and, to the authors, almost inevitable) evolution of computers into sentient beings, but also deals with human mind transfer. Richard Doyle ‘s Wetwares: Experiments in PostVital Living extensively with uploading from the perspective of distributed embodiment, arguing for example that humans are currently part of the ” artificial life phenotype “. Doyle’s vision reverses the polarity is uploading, with artificial life forms Such As uploads Actively seeking out biological Embodiment of Their share as reproductive strategy.
Kenneth D. Miller, a professor of neuroscience at Columbia and a co-director of the Center for Neuroscience, raised questions about the practice of mind uploading. His major argument is that reconstructing neurons and their connections is in itself a formidable task, but it is far from being sufficient. Operation of brain depends on the dynamics of electrical and biochemical signal exchange between neurons. Therefore capturing them in a single “frozen” state may prove insufficient. In addition, the nature of these signals may require modeling down to molecular level and beyond. Therefore, while not rejecting the idea in principle, Miller believes that the complexity of the “absolute” duplication of an individual mind is insurmountable for the nearest hundred years. 
- BRAIN Initiative
- Brain transplant
- Cylon (reimagining)
- Democratic transhumanism
- Human Brain Project
- Isolated brain
- Ship of Theseus -thought experiment asking if objects having all parts replaced fundamentally remain the same object
- Hypothesis simulation
- Technologically enabled telepathy
- Turing test
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- Jump up^ “We’ll be uploading our entire MINDS to computers by 2045 and our bodies will be replaced by machines within 90 years,” Google expert claims ” . Daily Mail . London.
- Jump up^ “We’ll be uploading our minds to computers by 2045 and our bodies will be replaced by machines within 90 years,” Google expert claims – KurzweilAI ” . kurzweilai.net .
- Jump up^ “Mind uploading & digital immortality may be reality by 2045, futurists say – KurzweilAI” . kurzweilai.net .
- Jump up^ Will You Ever Be Able to Upload Your Brain? , www.nytimes.com